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ALGORITHMIC INJUSTICE: HOW THE WISCONSIN SUPREME 
COURT FAILED TO PROTECT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN STATE V. 
LOOMIS 
Katherine Freeman* 
Risk assessment algorithms are equations designed to take 
large amounts of information about an offender’s past criminal 
experience, as well as other biographical and psychological 
information, and use it to compute a score that ranks an offender 
at various risk levels. Depending on which body within the system 
is utilizing it, the score is then used to make parole decisions, 
rehabilitation program placements, and, problematically, 
sentencing decisions. In State v. Loomis, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court ruled that the risk assessment algorithm, entitled 
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions (“COMPAS”), could be used during sentencing, offering 
only a series of warning labels intended to prevent judges from 
relying too heavily on COMPAS results during sentencing. This 
Recent Development argues that the court misapplied the 
precedent and offered no actual protections of the due process 
clause and proposes more effective solutions to address the issues 
of COMPAS in the sentencing process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Algorithms are so prevalent in today’s world that an individual 
would be hard-pressed to go a week without somehow interacting 
with one. A person’s credit score, their Google search results, and 
even the words that a character in a video game says to the player, 
are all decided by algorithms.1 They can seem efficient and 
streamlined, a nice package of data that reduces all the time and 
painstaking labor involved when humans have to make similar 
calculations, but should algorithms actually play a role in the 
sentencing process, a process that necessarily affects an 
individual’s liberty? 
To some, algorithms are the new go-to tools to use in order to 
propel the justice system into a new age. The algorithms that 
populate the criminal justice world are called risk assessment 
algorithms.2 Parole boards and prisons have been using risk 
                                                
 1 See Neha Sethi, Algorithms in our daily life, LIVEMINT (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.livemint.com/Specials/34LMe9rhl7u4fVJPKPtJEN/Algorithms-in-
our-daily-life.html. 
 2 See Maggie Koerth-Baker, The Calculus of Criminal Risk: The Justice 
System Has Come to Rely Heavily on Quantitative Assessments of Criminal 
Risk. How Well They Work Is a Complicated Question, UNDARK (June 17, 
2016), http://undark.org/article/of-algorithms-and-criminal-risk-a-critical-
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assessment algorithms for some time to make decisions on whether 
or not to release an offender and what programs would best suit the 
offender’s needs while he or she is in prison.3 Some police 
departments have even begun using risk assessment algorithms to 
predict which individuals are likely to be involved in violent 
crimes.4 Now, courts are beginning to look to algorithms as a 
source of aid during the sentencing process.5 
Additional information provided during the sentencing process 
often results in a more nuanced understanding of each defendant, 
and algorithms present a convenient way to package a lot of 
information into one report. However, the efficiency provided by 
risk assessment algorithms comes with risks that threaten the Due 
Process Clause protections in place during the sentencing phase. 
While the Due Process Clause appears concretely in the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution, the Supreme Court incorporated 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution against the states via 
the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The clause protects citizens against 
the divestment of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”7 The act of sentencing someone is the very definition of 
depriving them of liberty. Risk assessment algorithms used during 
sentencing threaten to strip that liberty from defendants for the 
sake of appearing technologically advancement and the ease of 
                                                                                                         
review/ (citing Sonya Starr, the University of Michigan’s co-director of the 
empirical legal studies center). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Monica Davie, Chicago Police Try to Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/us/armed-
with-data-chicago-police-try-to-predict-who-may-shoot-or-be-shot.html. 
 5 See Anna Maria Berry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing: Should 
Prison Sentences Be Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-
sentencing#.kmIWuDJLS (discussing risk assessment algorithms used during 
sentencing, specifically the one being developed in Pennsylvania). 
 6 Milton R. Underwood, Due Process Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION, 
http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/amendments/14/essays/170/due-process-
clause (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). 
 7 Id. 
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compiling large amounts of information into one over-simplified 
score. 
ProPublica examined one such algorithm, known as COMPAS, 
in-depth,8 and the results showed that the algorithm skewed 
towards labeling black defendants as high risk and white 
defendants as low risk.9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently 
approved that same algorithm in State v. Loomis, acknowledging 
the pitfalls of the program, but offering only a handful of warning 
labels to protect defendants.10 
This Recent Development argues that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court incorrectly assessed the impact of the COMPAS algorithm 
and that courts should not use risk assessment algorithms during 
the sentencing process without stronger due process protections in 
place, if courts are to use the algorithms at all. Part II provides 
background on risk assessment algorithms and due processing law 
as it relates to sentencing. Part III analyzes the Court’s arguments 
and why its decision was incorrect. Part IV proposes more 
appropriate solutions to the issues presented in State v. Loomis in 
the form of stronger due process protections. Finally, Part V 
concludes by examining the potential future of COMPAS in the 
courtroom and stating the need for a moratorium on the use of 
COMPAS for sentencing. 
                                                
 8 ProPublica is a non-profit investigative journalism organization that focuses 
on public interest issues. They are a strictly non-partisan organization stating 
that they “won’t lobby” and “won’t ally with politicians or advocacy groups.” 
They create series for their investigative projects, compiling studies and articles 
into document groups on their website for issues such as drug overdose, debt, 
prosecutorial misconduct, and several other public interest focused topics. About 
Us, PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 25, 
2016). 
 9 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used across the 
Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased against Blacks, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-
risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. 
 10 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 770–71 (Wis. 2016). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This section examines the background science of risk 
assessment algorithms and the case law that State v. Loomis 
references. First, it examines the exact way in which risk 
assessment algorithms—specifically COMPAS—work, including 
the information that they ground their analysis in and the way in 
which the system assesses that information to generate a risk 
assessment score. Next, this section discusses general details of the 
case precedent that the Wisconsin Supreme Court cites in its 
analysis of the State v. Loomis case. 
A. The Technology of Risk Assessment Algorithms 
While the first risk assessment algorithms started out as simple 
tools, classifying defendants into often comically named categories 
like ‘The Ne’er-Do-Well’ and ‘The Ruffian,’ risk assessment 
technology has become increasingly refined and complex.11 
Offenders answer questions regarding their criminal and personal 
history. The factors are both static and dynamic because certain 
concrete facts like criminal history and family criminal history are 
assessed, but personal beliefs and thought processes about various 
things such as trust levels and whether certain scenarios are right 
or wrong are also considered.12 The dynamic factors include a 
statement or question followed by a scale of answers including 
“strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “not sure,” “agree,” or “strongly 
agree” that an offender marks in response.13 In order to account for 
inaccurate answers from untruthful defendants, COMPAS has 
three validity tests that “‘flag’ the top 5% to 10% of the population 
whose answers are suspect.”14 The “defensiveness test” deals with 
                                                
 11 See Koerth-Baker, supra note 2 (citing Sonya Starr, the University of 
Michigan’s co-director of the empirical legal studies center). 
 12 See id.; Risk Assessment, NORTHPOINTE (2011), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-Assessment-
COMPAS-CORE.html [hereinafter Northpointe Risk Assessment]. 
 13 Northpointe Risk Assessment, supra note 12. 
 14 COMPAS Risk & Need Assessment System: Selected Questions Posed by 
Inquiring Agencies, NORTHPOINTE (2012), 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/downloads/FAQ_Document.pdf. 
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offenders who are trying to avoid revealing things about 
themselves, the “random responding” tests “careless, inconsistent 
responding that may verge on sabotage[,]” and the “inconsistency 
test” examines the consistency between the criminal history of an 
offender and their high risk factors to determine if there are any 
anomalies.15 In order to receive answers to the questions needed to 
generate a COMPAS score, an agency can provide a survey form 
to an offender or they can have an interviewer complete the form 
while interviewing the offender.16 The particular path followed to 
gather the information—interview or form—depends on a 
particular agency’s preferences.17 All of the data gathered is 
processed by an algorithm which ranks the offender’s recidivism 
risk level as “‘low[,]’ ‘medium,’ or ‘high.’”18 
Northpointe created COMPAS, the particular risk assessment 
algorithm at issue in this recent development.19 The algorithm uses 
information gleaned from a 137-question survey separated into 
several separate sections20 and from an individual’s public criminal 
records.21 The separate sections of the survey are entitled: “Current 
Charges,” “Criminal History,” “Non-Compliance,” “Family 
Criminality,” “Peers,” “Substance Abuse,” “Residence/Stability,” 
“Social Environment,” “Education,” “Vocation,” 
“Leisure/Recreation,” “Social Isolation,” “Criminal Personality,” 
“Anger,” and “Criminal Attitudes.”22 
The program consists of risk scales and needs scales.23 
Northpointe designed the risk scales to predict which offenders 
will reoffend and which will not.24 Need scales, on the other hand, 
                                                
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See NORTHPOINTE INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 1 
(Northpointe Inc., 2015). 
 20 Northpointe Risk Assessment, supra note 12. 
 21 NORTHPOINTE INC., supra note 19, at 27. 
 22 Northpointe Risk Assessment, supra note 12. 
 23 NORTHPOINTE INC., supra note 19, at 4. 
 24 Id. at 12. 
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are not predictive.25 Instead, needs scales aim to describe 
defendant’s deficits in areas such as employment, education, and 
cognition and are meant to establish target areas for intervention 
efforts.26 The need scales are often used by parole officers and 
prison officials to match offenders with the best methods for 
rehabilitative and interventionist efforts.27 
When the scale scores are calculated, they are then converted 
into decile scores ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).28 
According to Northpointe, the decile scores correlate with the 
normative group in that a score of 1 means that the offender’s scale 
score is in the lowest 10% of the norm group, a score of 2 is above 
10% and below 20%, and so on. As the COMPAS Practitioner’s 
Guide explains, it is generally seen that a “1- 4: scale score is low 
relative to other offenders in norm group; [a] 5- 7: scale score is 
medium relative to other offenders in norm group; [and a] 8- 10: 
scale score is high relative to other offenders in norm group.”29 The 
algorithm links these scores, however, to norm groups consisting 
of information from assessments from prison and parole agencies, 
jails, and probation agencies.30 There are currently eight norm 
subgroups in place: “(1) male prison/parole, (2) male jail, (3) male 
probation, (4) male composite, (5) female prison/parole, (6) female 
jail, (7) female probation, and (8) female composite.”31 
Northpointe assembled these groups from “over 30,000 COMPAS 
Core assessments conducted between January 2004 and November 
2005 at prison, parole, jail and probation sites across the United 
States.”32 When a particular agency uses COMPAS, Northpointe 
also adjusts the norm group to reflect the population within the 
particular state the agency is located in. 
                                                
 25 Id. at 16. 
 26 Id. at 16–17. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 9.  
 29 NORTHPOINTE INC., supra note 19, at 9. 
 30 Id. at 12. 
 31 Id. at 11. 
 32 Id. 
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The calculated decile scores rely on the composition of the 
norm group.33 Therefore, the scores of offenders that compile the 
norm group will always affect the computation of the decile 
scores.34 This means “if the norm group happens to consist mainly 
of offenders with low risk of violent recidivism, the decile scores 
for Violent Recidivism Risk would be biased in the other direction, 
and high scores could be associated with individuals who are 
actually not high risk for violent recidivism.”35 
Northpointe does cite to validation studies that researches have 
conducted on the accuracy of COMPAS.36 These studies calculate 
the “area under the receiver operating characteristic curve 
(AUC)[,]” a scale for which scores from “0.70 to 0.75 indicate 
moderate to good predictive accuracy.”37 The AUC, Northpointe 
notes, “is the most widely used measure of predictive accuracy in 
criminal justice, psychology, medicine, and related fields.” 
Northpointe cites to many validation studies, mostly conducted by 
their own employees, including a study of the “AUCS for the 
General Recidivism Risk Scale and the any arrest outcome for a 
Michigan reentry sample.”38 This study showed AUCS ranging 
from .71-.78 and found general consistency among the risk scores 
for Hispanic, black, and white offenders.39 The sample size for 
Hispanic offenders, however, was significantly smaller than the 
other two groups, and smaller sample sizes can make the 
computation of AUCS more difficult and less accurate.40 
Additionally, Northpointe conducted the study themselves, rather 
                                                
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 NORTHPOINTE INC., supra note 19, at 13–25. 
 37 Id. at 13. 
 38 Id. at 16 (discussing the results of the Michigan study). Note that AUCS is 
the same as AUC. AUCS simply refers to the plural of AUC. 
 39 Id. at 15 (showing figure 3.3, which is a table including the AUCs of the 
Michigan study). 
 40 See id. at 14–15 (showing the results and discussing a different study that 
was unreliable due to its extremely limited sample size). 
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than an independent, impartial group examining the accuracy of 
COMPAS.41 
B. Criticism of Risk Assessment Algorithms 
When addressing individuals at the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting in 2014, then-
Attorney General Eric Holder voiced his concerns about the use of 
risk assessment algorithms during the sentencing process declaring 
the following: 
Although these measures were crafted with the best of 
intentions, I am concerned that they may inadvertently 
undermine our efforts to ensure individualized and equal 
justice. By basing sentencing decisions on static factors and 
immutable characteristics – like the defendant’s education 
level, socioeconomic background, or neighborhood – they 
may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are 
already far too common in our criminal justice system and 
in our society.42 
Holder acknowledged that in areas such as probation, the 
algorithms often served to benefit defendants,43 yet he urged that 
using the algorithms during sentencing would require a careful 
process involving a combination of tactics, rather than sole reliance 
on risk assessments.44 
                                                
 41 See id. at 13 (referencing the studies conducted on the Michigan 
Department of Corrections, all of which Northpointe conducted via a 
combination of individuals including Brennan and Dietrich, two people 
consistently linked to Northpointe). Although Northpointe surely knows the 
intricacies of their technology, it would be best for an outside group to have 
conducted the study, because Northpointe is a for-profit company and its profits 
depend upon convincing states to purchase a contract to use COMPAS. 
 42 Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech at the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice 
Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014). 
 43 Id. (noting, in particular, that algorithms used outside of the sentencing 
process can help with the allocation of police resources and have the potential to 
increase community resources for defendants and lead to better allocation of 
those resources for the defendants who most need them). 
 44 Id. 
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ProPublica conducted a more recent study, specifically 
focusing on the validity of COMPAS.45 The ProPublica study 
calculated data on over 7,000 offenders who received risk 
assessment scores following their arrests in 2013 and 2014 and 
examined whether they were charged with a new crime over the 
following two years.46 The validity of the various COMPAS scales 
fluctuated.47 The study found that violent recidivism scales were 
accurate only 20% of the time, while the scale deeming people 
likely to re-offend accurately predicted recidivism for 61% of the 
offenders.48 Still, as ProPublica pointed out, that is only “somewhat 
more accurate than a coin flip.”49 The overall lack of accuracy, 
however, was only the beginning of the issues ProPublica 
discovered in analyzing COMPAS. 
The aspect most heavily highlighted by the study was the 
disparity between scores assigned to white defendants and those 
assigned to black defendants.50 The study noted that “[w]hile Black 
defendants had higher recidivism rates overall, when adjusted for 
this difference and other factors, they were [45%] more likely to 
get a higher score than whites.”51 In terms of violent recidivism 
scales “[b]lack defendants were 77.3 percent more likely than 
white defendants to receive a higher score . . . .”52 In analyzing 
how many defendants were labeled high risk, yet did not go on to 
reoffend within those two years, ProPublica found that white 
defendants were incorrectly labeled 23.5% of the time, and black 
defendants were mislabeled 44.9% of the time.53 Low risk scores 
were skewed towards white offenders.54 Exactly 47.7% of white 
                                                
 45 Angwin, et al., supra note 9. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Jeff Larson, et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-
analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Angwin et al., supra note 9. 
 54 Id. 
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offenders labeled low risk went on to re-offend, while only 28% of 
black offenders labeled low risk re-offended.55 ProPublica’s write 
up of the study addressed the fact that other studies have not found 
similar disparity in COMPAS results.56 Many of the studies, 
however, have been completed in contingency with agencies 
already under contract with Northpointe, or by individuals 
employed by Northpointe themselves.57 The ProPublica report 
explains that many of these studies also “did not examine whether 
different races were classified differently as low or high risk.”58 
The studies instead focused on overall validity and whether the 
scores have generalized consistency without analyzing the 
particulars of low-risk or high-risk scores assigned to offenders of 
different races. Furthermore, ProPublica noted that Wisconsin has 
yet to conduct its own validation study of COMPAS and that 
officials did not comment to ProPublica on whether it would 
conduct one in the future. 59 
Northpointe responded to ProPublica’s study by criticizing the 
results and declaring that its software is unbiased.60 ProPublica 
stood by its research, insisting that while Northpointe was 
technically correct, it framed its explanation in a way that avoided 
addressing the bias.61 It cited Andrew Gelman, a Columbia 
University statistics professor, in the following excerpt: 
‘This is a situation where even if the system could be 
calibrated correctly’ – meaning, it’s equally accurate 
                                                
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. (discussing New York’s evaluation of COMPAS, which was not 
conducted until years after New York had already been using the software and 
another validation study conducted by Tim Brennan, the founder of 
Northpointe). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Angwin et. al., supra note 9. 
   60NORTHPOINTE INC., COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY 
EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY (Northpointe Inc.  2016). 
 61 Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, ProPublica Responds to Company’s Critique 
of Machine Bias Story, PROPUBLICA (July 29, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-responds-to-companys-critique-
of-machine-bias-story. 
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between racial groups — ‘it can be unfair to different 
groups,’ Gelman said. ‘From the perspective of the 
sentencer it might be unbiased,’ he said. ‘But from the 
perspective of a criminal defendant it could be biased’.62 
As ProPublica and many individuals have pinpointed, the 
perspective of a criminal defendant is what matters in sentencing.63 
It is the defendant’s life that is being irrevocably changed by the 
sentencing process, and it is he or she who is protected by due 
process. The fact that a system, proven to be biased, is allowed to 
be used during the sentencing process without any validation study 
by the State approving its use completely ignores the foundational 
notions of sentencing due process. 
C. Background Law 
As this recent development focuses specifically on a case from 
Wisconsin, the law analyzing due process rights during the 
sentencing process comes mostly from Wisconsin cases. There are 
two particular lines of case law that present due process issues 
regarding the use of COMPAS during sentencing, one addressing 
the accuracy of sentencing and the other addressing the 
individualization of sentencing.64 
In 1977, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of accuracy 
during sentencing	in Gardner v. Florida.65 The case arose from the 
capital sentencing of Gardner, whom the court convicted of first-
degree murder.66 In sentencing Gardner, the judge referred to a pre-
sentence investigation report, including a confidential portion 
containing information not disclosed to the defendant.67 In drafting 
the opinion, Justice Stevens ruled that the due process clause 
protected sentencing and that withholding the information from the 
                                                
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757–74 (Wis. 2016) (citing to these 
lines of cases when addressing the defendant’s arguments and separating the 
defendant’s argument into these sections). 
 65 Gardner v. Fla., 430 U.S. 349, 351–52 (1977). 
 66 Id. at 351. 
 67 Id. 
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defendant constituted a violation of his due process rights.68 The 
Court reasoned that “[t]he defendant ha[d] a legitimate interest in 
the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of 
sentence even if he may have no right to object to a particular 
result of the sentencing process.”69 
Following Gardner, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided 
State v. Skaff, in which the lower court sentenced the defendant for 
delivery and possession of cocaine.70 The pre-sentencing 
investigation (“PSI”) report was provided to the defendant’s 
counsel, however the attorney in the case was instructed not to 
allow the defendant to read the PSI.71 The court emphasized the 
defendant’s role in assessing the accuracy of sentencing, stating 
that “[t]o deny Skaff timely access to his PSI, pursuant to court 
policy, is to prejudicially deny him an essential factor of due 
process, i.e., a procedure conducive to sentencing based on correct 
information.”72 Any errors in the PSI, the court explained, could 
affect the sentence, thereby affecting a decision made about the 
defendant’s future based on information regarding the defendant 
himself.73 Whether the defense counsel has access to the 
information contained in a PSI or not, the Skaff court made it clear 
that the defendant must have the means to examine the accuracy of 
his sentencing and the factors influencing it.74 To prevent him from 
such means would be to violate the Due Process Clause.75 Both 
Skaff and Gardner highlight the utmost importance of accuracy 
during sentencing and, even more importantly, the defendant’s 
right to assess that accuracy himself in the face of others 
attempting to shield the sentencing decisions from his scrutiny. 
In addition to the right to accurate sentencing, another 
important due process right during sentencing that has developed 
                                                
 68 Id. at 360–62. 
 69 Id. at 358. 
 70 State v. Skaff, 447 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
 71 Id. at 86. 
 72 Id. at 88. 
 73 Id. at 88–89. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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in the courts is a defendant’s right to an individualized sentence, a 
right highlighted in the Wisconsin case State v. Gallion.76 Gallion 
concerned a defendant who had plead guilty and was sentenced to 
twenty-one years in prison.77 Subsequently, Gallion filed a motion 
for modification of his sentence.78 The court approved the motion 
on direct appeal, allowing the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to 
review it.79 Ultimately, the court found that there were no due 
process violations during the course of Gallion’s sentencing, but 
the opinion established the fundamental nature of individualized 
sentencing.80 The court addressed individualized sentencing in 
connection with sentencing guidelines, noting that while 
sentencing guidelines are intended to aid judges in their 
determinations, “that does not mean there is less of a need for the 
exercise of discretion. Individualized sentencing, after all, has long 
been a cornerstone of the Wisconsin criminal justice 
jurisprudence.”81 
Both the right to individualized sentencing and the right of a 
defendant to observe and assess the accuracy of information used 
during sentencing conflict with the very nature of the COMPAS 
algorithm. Proprietary algorithms do not speak to ease of access.82 
Rather, they completely block individuals outside the company 
from examining their source code and the way the scores are 
                                                
 76 State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d 197, 209 (Wis. 2004). 
 77 Id. at 202. 
				78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 209. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Erin E. Kenneally, Gatekeeping Out Of The Box: Open Source Software As 
A Mechanism To Assess Reliability For Digital Evidence, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
13, 11–15 (2001). While open source software allows individuals other than the 
software developer a program’s code to, proprietary software is often described 
as a “black box” because of the way in which it prevents any outside individuals 
from viewing the source code. Blocking this code from outside view prevents 
anyone other than the developer and individuals within the software corporation 
from being able to understand exactly what occurs “between the [data] input and 
output stages.” Essentially, outsiders can see the results of the software, but how 
that result was achieved is shrouded in secrecy. Id. 
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ultimately calculated.83 Additionally, the fact that the algorithm 
calculates scores based on group data effectively shoehorns a 
defendant into a grouping score.84 True individualization is thereby 
absent from COMPAS scores since the score is necessarily a 
calculation for a generalized group.85 Ultimately, the case law leads 
to the question of whether sentencing algorithms can truly co-exist 
with the Due Process Clause. 
III. ANALYSIS OF LOOMIS V. STATE—WHERE AND HOW THE 
COURT WENT WRONG 
On July 13, 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed a 
state circuit court’s use of COMPAS during sentencing in the face 
of constitutional challenges.86 This decision was the first to address 
the constitutionality of using risk-assessment algorithms during 
sentencing.87 While the court had the opportunity to take a 
progressive step towards protecting defendants’ due process rights, 
they instead incorrectly applied precedent and issued flimsy 
warning labels that offer little to no protection against the use of 
COMPAS.88 
The case arose from the sentencing of Eric Loomis.89 The 
prosecution accused Loomis of being the driver in a drive-by 
                                                
 83 Id. at 14 (explaining that proprietary algorithms shield “what happens 
between the data input and output stages,” and saying that “[w]ithout access to 
these ’blueprints” a computer professional is left to infer, based on his 
knowledge and experience, the causes of and solutions to software problems[]”). 
 84 See Northpointe, Inc., Practitioner’s Guide to COMPAS Core, 31 (Mar. 19, 
2015), NORTHPOINTE, 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/Practitioners-Guide-
COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf (discussing the fact that COMPAS is not designed 
to calculate scores at an individual level because it relies on group data). 
 85 See id. 
 86 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016). 
 87 Id. (noting that while the Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously ruled on 
allowing COMPAS use during sentencing, the case did not deal with 
constitutional challenges). 
 88 Id. at 770–71. 
 89 Id. at 753. 
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shooting, and Loomis pled guilty to two lesser charges.90 In order 
to aid in the determination of Loomis’s sentence, the Court ordered 
a presentencing investigation that ultimately included a COMPAS 
risk assessment reporting that Loomis was a high risk for pretrial 
recidivism risk, general recidivism risk, and violent recidivism 
risk.91 In denying Loomis’ probation, the circuit court specifically 
mentioned COMPAS stating: 
You’re identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as an 
individual who is at high risk to the community. In terms of 
weighing the various factors, I’m ruling out probation 
because of the seriousness of the crime and because your 
history, your history on supervision, and the risk 
assessment tools that have been utilized, suggest that 
you’re extremely high risk to re-offend.92 
Following his sentencing, “Loomis filed a motion for post-
conviction relief requesting a new sentencing hearing.”93 He 
challenged the court’s use of COMPAS, arguing that using it 
during sentencing violated his due process rights.94 To support his 
argument, he brought in testimony from an expert witness, Dr. 
David Thompson,95 disputing COMPAS’ accuracy and pointing 
out its lack of transparency.96 Nevertheless, the district court 
denied the motion, arguing that it would have given Loomis’ the 
                                                
 90 Id. at 754. 
 91 Id. at 754–55. 
 92 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 755. 
 93 Id. at 756. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Dr. Thompson is a board certified forensic psychologist with “extensive 
training in COMPAS, psychometrics, and statistics.” Brief of Defendant-
Appellant at 13–14, State v. Loomis 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) (No. 
2015AP157-CR). 
 96 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756–57 (Wis. 2016). Specifically, Dr. 
Thompson said, “The Court does not know how the COMPAS compares that 
individual’s history with the population that it’s comparing them with. The 
Court doesn’t even know whether that population is a Wisconsin population, a 
New York population, a California population. . . . There’s all kinds of 
information that the court doesn’t have, and what we’re doing is we’re mis-
informing the court when we put these graphs in front of them and let them use 
it for sentence.” Id. 
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same sentence with or without COMPAS.97 Subsequently, Loomis 
filed an appeal, and the court of appeals sent the case to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court for resolution of the due process 
issues.98 
On appeal, Loomis presented the following three due 
process arguments against the use of COMPAS during 
sentencing: (1) it violates a defendant’s right to be 
sentenced based upon accurate information, in part because 
the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents him from 
assessing its accuracy; (2) it violates a defendant’s right to 
an individualized sentence; and (3) it improperly uses 
gendered assessments in sentencing.99 
The following subsections focus on Loomis’ first two 
arguments and argue that the Court should have ruled in favor of 
Loomis. First, it examines Loomis’ argument that COMPAS 
inhibits a defendant’s right to accurate sentencing, and second, the 
subsection examines the argument that COMPAS interferes with a 
defendant’s right to individualized sentencing. 
A. The Ability to “Refute, Supplement, and Explain” 
To support his argument that a defendant has a right to 
sentencing based on accurate information, Loomis pointed to Skaff 
and Gardner and analogized them to his case.100 He argued that just 
as the defendants in Skaff and Gardner were precluded from 
accessing their sentencing decisions, he too was prevented from 
fully assessing the accuracy of his sentencing because of the 
proprietary nature of COMPAS.101 However, in response, the court 
reasoned that Skaff and Gardner were not similar to Loomis’ case 
                                                
 97 Id. at 757. 
 98 State v. Loomis, 2015 Wisc. App. LEXIS 722, *8, 2015 WL 5446731 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 99 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757 (Wis. 2016). In analyzing the court’s 
decision, this recent develop focuses on Loomis’ first two arguments and 
proposes that COMPAS does, in fact, bar defendants’ due process rights to 
sentencing accuracy and individualization. 
 100 Id. at 760–64. 
 101 Id. at 761. 
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because Loomis had an opportunity to “refute, supplement, and 
explain” the COMPAS risk assessment score since the score itself 
and the report that accompanied it were not hidden from him.102 In 
issuing this ruling, however, the court misapplied the precedent 
and failed to account for the realities of for-profit businesses and 
the advances in technology that had occurred since Skaff and 
Gardner had been decided.103 
The court reasoned that Loomis had the opportunity to “refute, 
supplement, and explain” the COMPAS assessment by pointing 
out that “Northpointe’s 2015 Practitioner’s Guide to COMPAS 
explains that the risk scores are based largely on static information 
(criminal history), with limited use of some dynamic variables (i.e. 
criminal associates, substance abuse).”104 In pointing to the 
practitioner’s guide as a defendant’s tool for assessing the accuracy 
of the score, the court blatantly ignored the fact that Northpointe is 
a for-profit company with a $1,765,334 contract at stake in 
Wisconsin’s use of their services.105 With that amount of money 
tied to the use of COMPAS, Northpointe is thereby a biased party 
that cannot be relied upon to determine the accuracy of the risk 
assessment score.106 By directing the defendant to assess the score 
                                                
 102 Id. 
 103 Gardner and Skaff were decided in 1977 and 1989 respectively. Between 
the 1970s and the 1980s the first computers were invented and the World Wide 
Web followed in 1989, the same year Skaff was decided. It is obvious, therefore, 
that the courts in Skaff and Gardner did not have to grapple with technology 
anywhere close to COMPAS. See Chris Woodford, Technology Timeline, 
EXPLAIN THAT STUFF (October 13, 2016), 
http://www.explainthatstuff.com/timeline.html. 
 104 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761. 
 105 Statement of Work: Wisconsin Department of Services FY 2016 Services, 
NORTHPOINTE (Apr. 20, 2015), https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-
justice/EPIC-16-06-23-WI-FOIA-201600805-FY16Contract.pdf [hereinafter 
Statement of Work]. There are several other states who are also in contracts with 
Northpointe to use COMPAS. In addition to Wisconsin, Florida, Michigan, New 
Mexico, and Wyoming all use COMPAS at some point in the criminal justice 
process. See Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, EPIC (last visited on 
Oct. 25, 2015), https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/. 
 106 Consider the Volkswagen emissions scandal where the company’s 
software for its “pollution-control equipment” was considered proprietary and, 
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with the help of the practitioner’s guide, the court ignored the 
realities of the for-profit business world and the lengths that 
businesses will go to maintain their profits. 
The court went on to say that “to the extent that Loomis’s risk 
assessment is based upon his answers to questions and publicly 
available data about his criminal history[,]”107 he can verify the 
accuracy of the report by looking at the survey to assess if the 
answers were in deed accurate. In its own words, however, the 
court pinpoints the main issue at hand without realizing it.108 
Neither Loomis nor the courts know to what “extent” Northpointe 
based the risk assessment off of those factors. While the guide may 
be a neatly packaged way for Northpointe to explain the 
sociological theories backing their program and the research 
supporting the validity of it—research that is often conducted by 
their own employees109—it does not explain the value given to each 
factor, nor does it include a specific breakdown of every factor 
used in the algorithm.110 Rather, the company hides the details of 
                                                                                                         
therefore, protected from “outside scrutiny.” Since no outside group could 
examine the software code, Volkswagen was able to defraud customers for 
years. They did so in an effort to make a profit, as is the natural inclination of a 
corporation. Left to its own devices it would be easy for Northpointe to do 
something similar and to use the proprietary nature of COMPAS to shield its 
actions. See David Bollier, Volkswagen Scandal Confirms the Dangers of 
Proprietary Code, DAVID BOLLIER: NEWS AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMONS 
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://bollier.org/blog/volkswagen-scandal-confirms-dangers-
proprietary-code. 
 107 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761. 
 108 See id. 
 109 Tim Brennan et al., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS 
Risk and Needs Assessment System, 36 Criminal Justice and Behavior 21, 21-40 
(2009); William Dietrich et al., Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Reentry Risk 
Scales, 1-45 (2013). 
 110 “The amount of the value is determined by the strength of the item’s 
relationship to person offense recidivism that we observed in our study data. The 
weighted items are then added together to calculate the risk score: Violent 
Recidivism Risk Score = (age*w)+(age-at-arrest*w)+(history of violence*w) + 
(vocation education*w) + (history of noncompliance*w).” Northpointe, 
Inc., Practitioner’s Guide to COMPAS Core, 31 (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/Practitioners-Guide-
COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf. 
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their algorithm by declaring that it is a “core piece of [their] 
business”111 and, as such, the company maintains it must shield the 
code from examination because of its proprietary nature.112 
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the practitioner’s 
guide point to many validation studies to support the accuracy of 
the program,113 the court in Skaff emphasized that the core of their 
ruling was not whether the information was accurate or not.114 
Rather, the point was that the defendant was denied the “means to 
ascertain whether there was any misinformation.”115 Without 
access to the source code of the algorithm, neither Loomis nor any 
other defendant truly has the “means” to investigate any potential 
misinformation. Since neither the court nor the defendants are 
certain of what goes into the calculation of risk scores, defendants 
can only present a superficial argument against the elements that 
may or may not be included in the algorithm. 
While the court is correct in arguing that Skaff and Gardner 
dealt with situations where the lower courts completely barred the 
defendants from seeing information included in their PSI that the 
judges were able to examine, both decisions establish the 
importance of the accuracy of sentencing and the fundamental role 
that a defendant plays in assessing that accuracy.116 The state 
argued in Gardner that secrecy was required to convince certain 
individuals to come forward and that revealing the PSI to a 
defendant could jeopardize the availability of such evidence.117 In 
response, the court stated that “the interest in reliability plainly 
outweighs the State’s interest in preserving the availability of 
                                                
 111 Mitch Smith, In Wisconsin, a Backlash Against Using Data to Foretell 
Defendants’ Futures, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/backlash-in-wisconsin-against-using-
data-to-foretell-defendants-futures.html?_r=0. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Again, many of the studies that the court points to have been conducted by 
individuals connected to Northpointe. 
 114 State v. Skaff, 447 N.W.2d 84, 88–89 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See Gardner v. Fla., 430 U.S. 349, 351–52 (1977); Skaff, 447 N.W.2d at 85 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
				117 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 352. 
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comparable information in other cases.”118 In that moment, the 
Gardner court prioritized the defendant’s due process rights over 
the State’s desire to maintain secrecy. Here, the court has chosen to 
rank business above justice. 
Ultimately, the court did acknowledge that defendants have a 
right to due process and expressed some hesitation about the use of 
COMPAS during sentencing.119 Their solution, however, was to 
issue mere warning labels to other courts by stating the following: 
[A]ny PSI containing a COMPAS risk assessment must 
inform the sentencing court about the following cautions 
regarding a COMPAS risk assessment’s accuracy: (1) the 
proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to 
prevent disclosure of information relating to how factors 
are weighed or how risk scores are to be determined; (2) 
risk assessment compares defendants to a national sample, 
but no cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population 
has yet been completed; (3) some studies of COMPAS risk 
assessment scores have raised questions about whether they 
disproportionately classify minority offenders as having a 
higher risk of recidivism; and (4) risk assessment tools 
must be constantly monitored and re-normed for accuracy 
due to changing populations and subpopulations. Providing 
information to sentencing courts on the limitations and 
cautions attendant with the use of COMPAS risk 
assessments will enable courts to better assess the accuracy 
of the assessment and the appropriate weight to be given to 
the risk score. 120 
It is promising that the court did not ignore the issues regarding 
COMPAS’ validity. However, its solution does not address the fact 
that defendants do not have the resources at their disposal to 
effectively investigate the accuracy of COMPAS to the extent that 
due process requires. As can be seen in the next subsection, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court continued to fall short of providing an 
                                                
 118 Id. at 359. 
 119 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 763–64 (Wis. 2016). 
 120 Id. 
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actual solution when it narrowly interpreted case precedent and 
suggested more warning labels for Loomis’ second argument that 
COMPAS use compromises individualized sentencing. 
B. Individualized Sentencing 
In addition to arguing that COMPAS risk assessment scores do 
not provide defendants an opportunity to investigate their 
accuracy, Loomis also argued that using COMPAS during 
sentencing violates a defendant’s right to an individualized 
sentencing process.121 The court recognized that defendants did 
have a right to such sentencing and that COMPAS did generate 
data based on group statistics.122 However, it ruled that its use 
during sentencing did not violate due process because the 
COMPAS score is just one factor among several that are included 
in a pre-sentence investigation report.123 The court, however, failed 
to consider the amount of weight that individuals in today’s society 
place on technology and, again, issued a warning that does little to 
protect against violations of a defendant’s due process rights.124 To 
acknowledge these risks might mean removing algorithms from the 
sentencing process all together until extensive training takes place 
and more safety measures are arranged, but losing the efficiency of 
the algorithms is a low cost to bear when due process rights are at 
stake.125 
When addressing Loomis’ argument, the court pointed to 
Gallion, noting that the court in that case acknowledged that 
“[i]ndividualized sentencing, after all, has long been a cornerstone 
to Wisconsin’s criminal justice jurisprudence.”126 The court goes 
                                                
 121 Id. at 764. 
 122 Id. at 765. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See id. (“[T]he due process implications compel us to caution circuit courts 
that because COMPAS risk assessment scores are based on group data, they are 
able to identify groups of high-risk offenders—not a particular high-risk 
individual.”); see also infra pp. 22–24 (discussing how the court’s solution does 
not actually protect due process). 
 125 See infra Part IV. 
 126 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 764 (Wis. 2016) (citing State v. Gallion, 
678 N.W.2d 197, 216 (Wis. 2004)). 
DEC 2016] State v. Loomis 97 
on to admit Northpointe itself had stated that the methodology 
behind COMPAS “is not about prediction at the individual 
level.”127 However, the court qualified the continued use of 
COMPAS during sentencing by saying there would be a lack of 
individualized sentencing only “[i]f a COMPAS risk assessment 
were the determinative factor considered at sentencing.”128 The 
court argued that it is not a determinative factor because there are 
other details included in the pre-sentencing investigation report.129 
The court went on to reason that “[j]ust as corrections staff should 
disregard risk scores that are inconsistent with other factors, we 
expect that circuit courts will exercise discretion when assessing a 
COMPAS risk score with respect to each individual defendant.”130 
Rather than placing any actual restraint on the use of COMPAS 
and potentially upsetting Northpointe—who had already locked the 
state of Wisconsin into a contract for the 2016-17 year before the 
court issued its decision131—the court chose to place its entire faith 
in a circuit court’s ability to refrain from being swayed too heavily 
by COMPAS results. 
The particular problem with the court’s reasoning is that it 
places its trust in judges to consider the warnings and evaluate 
COMPAS risk assessment scores accordingly during an age where 
society is heavily affected by the “technology effect.”132 While it 
may be common practice to express deference to a judge’s 
discretion, the influence of the “technology effect” deteriorates the 
                                                
 127 Id. (citing NORTHPOINTE INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 
31 (Northpointe Inc., 2015), 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/Practitioners-Guide-
COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 765. 
 130 Id. at 764–65. 
 131 Statement of Work, supra note 105. 
 132 Univ. of Missouri-Columbia, Overconfidence in New Technologies Can 
Influence Decision-making, SCIENCEDAILY (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/04/150408100742.html. 
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trustworthiness of judiciary discretion.133 With or without a 
warning label, judges consistently give technology and forensic-
based evidence heavier weight than other factors, whether the 
judges giving such weight realize that they are doing so or not.134 
Studies have shown that people have “automation bias” and, 
therefore, place their trust in computer-generated assessments even 
when faced with evidence of the systems’ inaccuracies.135 As 
Danielle Citron136 phrased the issue in her discussion of 
technological due process, “[a]utomation bias effectively turns a 
computer program’s suggested answer into a trusted final 
decision.”137 
While automated decision-making tools may eliminate 
particular errors associated with human decision-making, they 
merely replace these eliminated errors with new forms of 
mistakes.138 According to Linda J. Sitka, a professor of psychology 
at the University of Illinois at Chicago, “most people will take the 
road of least cognitive effort, and rather than systematically 
analyze each decision, will use decision rules of thumb or 
                                                
 133 Id.; see also Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1271 (2008) (arguing that automation bias can affect a judge’s 
decision-making process). 
 134 Anna Green, Humans May Put Too Much Trust in Robots, Study Finds, 
MENTAL FLOSS (Mar. 2, 2016), http://mentalfloss.com/article/76387/humans-
may-put-too-much-trust-robots-study-finds (observing that even when a robot 
clearly led individuals away from marked exits in a fire-drill study and broke 
down while leading them, people still followed a robot, trusting it to lead them 
to safety). 
 135 Citron, supra note 133 (discussing such studies and why the presence of 
automation bias calls for technological due process). 
 136 Professor Danielle Citron is a law professor at the University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law whose research focuses on “information 
privacy, cyber law, automated systems, and civil rights.” Danielle Citron, 
Faculty Profiles, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND FRANCIS KING CAREY SCHOOL OF 
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 137 Citron, supra note 133, at 1272. 
 138 Linda J. Skitka, Does Automation Bias Decision-making?, 51 INT. J. 
HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES 991, 992 (1999). 
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heuristics . . . . Automated decision aids may act as one of these 
decision-making heuristics, and be used as a replacement for more 
vigilant system monitoring or decision making.”139 Furthermore, 
since individuals and agencies often employ algorithms to reduce 
human error, they can be seen as authoritative figures with more 
knowledge than the humans interpreting them and, therefore, the 
human users, such as judges, will adhere to what the algorithms 
decide despite the fact that such adherence might harm others.140 
This is because of the general power that authority figures hold and 
“people’s willingness to conform to the demands of an 
authority.”141 The court’s issuance of a cautionary statement to 
circuit courts, therefore, does little to protect defendants’ due 
process rights because automation bias renders such statements 
inane. 
Outside of the presence of automation bias, courts have 
repeatedly recognized that cautionary statements do little to 
prevent judges from considering certain factors once they have 
already been exposed to an individual’s conscious.142 In describing 
the concept of “un-ringing the bell” when issuing instructions to a 
jury to disregard a personal opinion expressed by a prosecutor, the 
court in United States v. Rodriguez explained that jury instructions 
are not as effective as they should be for three reasons: “one 
‘cannot unring a bell;’ ‘after the thrust of the saber it is difficult to 
                                                
 139 Id. 
 140 See id. 
 141 Id. at 992-93. 
 142 See Cynthia Dizikes & Stacy St. Clair, Jury Is out on Whether Barred 
Statements in Peterson Trial Will Be Ignored, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 8, 
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-18/news/ct-met-drew-
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(discussing a particular murder case where defense attorneys argued that a 
prosecutor had brought irrelevant evidence up at trial and that it should be 
dismissed and also citing to a previous case where such instructions to disregard 
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of their thoughts); Barry Popkik, Unring the Bell (Impossibility of Taking Back a 
Statement or Action) BARRY POPKIK (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/unring_the_bell 
(listing several cases and other materials that have mentioned the difficulty of 
“un-ringing the bell”). 
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say forget the wound;’ and finally, ‘if you throw a skunk into the 
jury box, you can’t instruct the jury not to smell it.’’143 As shown 
by the Rodriguez court and the general principal of un-ringing the 
bell, a mere statement made by a court does not have the amount of 
sway that the Wisconsin Supreme Court assumes it holds when 
deciding to issue cautionary statements in the place of actual 
reformations of COMPAS’ use in the courtroom. 
With the ingrained trust that individuals in the twenty-first 
century place in technology and the proven ineffectiveness of 
court’s cautionary statements, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
proposed solution will offer little actual help to preserve 
sentencing due process rights. Instead, the fact that “COMPAS risk 
assessment scores are based on group data”144 and “are able to 
identify groups of high-risk offenders—not a particular high-risk 
individual”145 will ultimately lead to a deterioration of 
individualized sentencing because of the existence of automation 
bias and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s failure to recognize the 
sway such bias has over people’s decisions. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION PROPOSAL 
While the court did not completely ignore the concerns 
surrounding the use of COMPAS during sentencing, it provided 
solutions that do not address the actual issues presented in the case. 
In place of actual restraints on COMPAS’ use or any measure that 
would have forced Northpointe to compromise the proprietary 
nature of their algorithm, the court offered mere warning labels to 
protect against any potential inaccuracies or lack of individualized 
decision-making.146 Certainly COMPAS does have its advantages, 
and in other areas of criminal justice, it can be extremely useful in 
aiding offenders and those in charge of them to make the best 
                                                
 143 United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 144 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 765 (Wis. 2016). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 767–70. 
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decisions for everyone involved;147 however, it is a flawed tool, and 
in its current state it does not belong in the world of sentencing. If 
courts are to use COMPAS during the sentencing process at all, 
they must put more extensive protections in place. There are two 
potential plans to safeguard due process. The first is working with 
Northpointe to switch COMPAS from a proprietary algorithm to 
an open-source algorithm that defendants can investigate and vet 
for themselves. This would necessarily conflict with Northpointe’s 
claim of proprietary interest, sacrificing proprietariness and 
business protection in exchange for ensuring the protection of the 
defendants whom the court system is actually affecting. The 
second is to arrange an auditing process where an overseer from 
outside the company would perform consistent validation checks 
on the system to ensure its accuracy and appropriate use. 
The main problem that COMPAS poses to a defendant’s right 
to investigate the accuracy of their PSI report and the information 
used within it is that Northpointe has declared COMPAS’ source 
code proprietary.148 This ultimately blocks a defendant’s access to 
the source code, the only thing that a defendant and their attorney 
can truly count on to break down exactly how a risk assessment 
algorithm works.149 While Northpointe asserts that the code must 
be proprietary150 in order to protect their business, there are similar 
                                                
 147 See generally NORTHPOINTE INC., supra note 19 (discussing the way 
COMPAS is used and how the different sections assessed can help practitioners 
address offenders’ needs). 
 148 See Mitch Smith, In Wisconsin, a Backlash Against Using Data to Foretell 
Defendants’ Futures, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), 
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risk assessment algorithms whose source codes are open to the 
public.151 Pennsylvania, in fact, is developing a similar algorithm, 
but is conducting the development in an almost completely 
transparent way, making reports and documents related to the 
algorithms process available to the public.152 Having complete 
access to the COMPAS source code would allow defense attorneys 
to employ their own experts to evaluate the scores so that they 
could better attack the results during cross-examination. 
Furthermore, several cases regarding open source codes for 
forensic technology such as DNA algorithms and breathalyzers 
have shown that a defense attorney’s extensive cross-examination 
of such technology can aid in finding errors within the technology, 
and thereby it increases the accuracy and reliability of such 
technology.153 Outside of the courtroom, public access to open 
source codes also facilitates further investigation and validation of 
technology.154 To deny a defendant access to the source code, 
                                                                                                         
Oct. 25, 2016) (defining proprietary information and describing its legal 
definitions and protections). 
 151 See Anna Maria Berry-Jester, et al., The New Science of Sentencing: 
Should Prison Sentences Be Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed 
Yet?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-
sentencing#.kmIWuDJLS (mentioning Pennsylvania’s risk assessment algorithm 
and its transparency). 
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 153 See FED. R. EVID. art, VIII advisory committee’s introductory note (“The 
belief, or perhaps hope, that cross-examination is effective in exposing 
imperfections of perception, memory, and narration is fundamental.”); Rebecca 
Wexler, Convicted by Code, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/10/06/defendants_should_be_abl
e_to_inspect_software_code_used_in_forensics.html (arguing that defendants 
should be able to inspect source codes of forensic technology because of the 
benefits of cross-examination). 
 154 See Wexler, supra note 153 (discussing how open-source codes have led to 
the discovery of flaws in forensic technology); Mark Hinkle, Open Source: A 
Platform for Innovation, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/11/open-
source-a-platform-for-innovation/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) (“The programs 
that have been developed in the open source software community are enablers 
for researchers to more effectively analyze the data in their endeavors regardless 
of their application.”). 
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therefore, not only inhibits the defendant’s ability to protect 
themselves against flawed technology, but also prevents the 
technology from potentially advancing.155 
Short of undertaking a long and arduous process of creating 
new legislation to compel businesses working with the criminal 
justice system to allow defendant’s access to the source code, the 
solution is for Wisconsin courts to arrange a compromise with 
Northpointe. Essentially, if Northpointe wishes to continue 
contracting with the Wisconsin courts, they must make their source 
code available to defendants and, thereby, to any experts necessary 
for the defendant to analyze the accuracy of their risk assessment 
scores. 
Unfortunately, even complete source code transparency does 
not solve all the issues surrounding risk assessment algorithms. For 
instance, knowing the source code of COMPAS would not 
eliminate the fact that algorithms often skew risk score levels 
depending on the race of the offender.156 Controversy still 
surrounds the algorithm in Pennsylvania because of the factors that 
the algorithm analyzes to compute risk scores, despite the fact that 
it is open-sourced.157 Ultimately, no measure of openness and 
public access to a source code can effectively solve the issues of a 
biased algorithm. At most, the open-source code would allow for 
defense experts and the public to pinpoint particular weaknesses of 
the code and to argue either against its use or for its improvement. 
Such suggestions, however, would need to be utilized by 
Northpointe itself to ultimately improve the algorithm or would 
                                                
 155 See Jed S. Rakoff, Full Text: Judge’s Protest Resignation Letter, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/full-text-judges-
protest-resignation-letter/2015/01/29/41659da6-a7e1-11e4-a2b2-
776095f393b2_story.html (“A primary way in which forensic science interacts 
with the courtroom is through discovery, for if an adversary does not know in 
advance sufficient information about the forensic expert and the methodological 
and evidentiary bases for that expert’s opinions, the testimony of the expert is 
nothing more than trial by ambush.”). 
 156 Berry-Jester, supra note 151 (discussing how, despite its transparency, 
there are elements of Pennsylvania’s algorithm that make it biased, like the 
factors used to assess offenders). 
 157 Id. 
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need to be acknowledged by judges as revealing damaging 
weaknesses that would prevent COMPAS from being relied upon 
in sentencing. 
A different potential solution, as Danielle Citron suggested, 
could be to arrange for an extensive training and auditing 
program.158 In order to use COMPAS during sentencing, judges 
would have to attend trainings that would assist them in 
understanding the benefits as well as the limitations of 
COMPAS.159 Currently, as seen by the lower court’s decision in 
Loomis, judges seem to have little to no knowledge about how 
COMPAS works.160 The criminal justice system entrusts judges 
with making incredibly important decisions about technology and 
science within the courtroom, and for judges to make such 
decisions without any actual understanding of the technology they 
are ruling on can lead to damaging mistakes in judgment.161 
In addition to the training, however, Wisconsin would need to 
arrange for a validation program which would continue to work 
with Northpointe in assessing and monitoring the validity of the 
program. This program would be most effective if combined with 
the previous proposed solution of an open-source code, although 
Northpointe could potentially exercise more protection of its 
proprietary interest in the source code by allowing only the 
impartial auditing agency access to the code. So far, Wisconsin has 
                                                
 158 See Danielle Citron, (Un)Fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing, 
FORBES (July 13, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-
scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#704438c64479 (discussing the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s proposed solution and the need for further due process 
protections). 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Certification by Wisconsin Court of Appeals, State v. Loomis, No. 
2015AP157-CR, 2015 Wisc. App. LEXIS 722 (Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 161 See Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, 16 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 
52–56 (2000) (discussing how a judge’s knowledge or lack thereof can affect 
their decisions in cases dealing with scientific issues such as “statistical 
estimation techniques” used in census sampling). 
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not yet conducted a single COMPAS validation study of its own.162 
To ensure maximum accuracy, it would be best to place a 
moratorium on the use of COMPAS during sentencing until 
extensive studying is completed and solutions are sought for ways 
to account for the bias that occurs in COMPAS computations. 
Ultimately, making COMPAS open-source or creating an 
auditing and training program are still compromised solutions. 
They allow the court system to continue to use COMPAS at 
sentencing, but, at this time, courts should not use systems like 
COMPAS for sentencing purposes. While some may argue that 
algorithms provide more information for sentencing and increases 
the objectivity of sentencing decisions, those aspects are 
outweighed by the blatant bias perpetuated by the COMPAS risk 
assessment survey and algorithm.163 Furthermore, as ProPublica 
pointed out, COMPAS is hardly the most accurate predictor.164 The 
heavy sway of a streamlined, technologically advanced program 
whose accuracy is hardly better than “a coin-flip”165 should not 
replace or taint the individualized sentencing process based on a 
judge’s full-scope review.166 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today’s society needs algorithms to operate many of the 
machines people have come to rely on. Without them, society 
would have to return to the process of searching through 
encyclopedias and books page by page to find an answer to even 
the simplest question. Still, no matter how useful and efficient 
                                                
 162 Julia Angwin, et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used across the 
Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased against Blacks, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-
risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. 
 163 Infra pp. 129–34. 
 164 Angwin, et al., supra note 159. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Arguably, a judge’s bias is certain to taint the sentencing process as well, 
but judges are human beings whose decisions can easily be analyzed, unlike 
COMPAS. Even if COMPAS were open-sourced, defendants would still have to 
employ experts to understand the algorithmic process and effectively investigate 
COMPAS. 
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algorithms are for Google searches, they are not yet, nor may they 
ever be, appropriate for sentencing. The Due Process Clause 
protects sentencing to ensure the accuracy and individualization of 
every defendant’s sentence. Allowing judges to rely on risk 
assessment algorithms like COMPAS while making sentencing 
decisions effectuates the deterioration of those due process rights. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that COMPAS did 
not violate due process rights, they narrowed their view too far 
when evaluating the precedent and gave little thought to society’s 
unshakeable trust in technology. 
While requiring COMPAS to be open-sourced and for an 
auditing and training regime to be enacted to oversee the use of 
COMPAS during sentencing could alleviate some of the issues 
presented, there is something to be said for sentencing performed 
by judiciary discretion without the aid of algorithms. Ultimately, 
judges are humans who do not carry the air of mystique and 
grandeur that technology bears. Therefore, it is easier to challenge 
and analyze their decisions when they allow bias to sway them one 
way or another. Perhaps in the future, when companies can fine-
tune algorithms to where they have fewer elements of 
discrimination tied into their formulas, and a system of oversight is 
in place to ensure that private companies do not seize the 
opportunity of wealth without regard for a defendant’s 
constitutional rights, COMPAS will find a welcome home in a pre-
sentencing investigation report. For now, however, it would be best 
to prevent courts from using COMPAS to decide an individual’s 
fate. 
 
 
